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## AN UNRECOGNIZED CONSTRUCTION OF THE LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE: THE SECOND PERSON SINGULAR IN GENERAL STATEMENTS OF FACT

BY WILLIAM GARDNER HALE

My paper deals with such Subjunctives as the independent ones in the familiar passages:

- A. Nil satis est, inquit, quia tanti quantum habeas *sis*; Hor. *Sat.* i. 1. 62.
- B. Assem habeas, assem *valeas*; Petron. 77.
- C. Ubi mortuos sis, ita *sis* ut nomen cluet; Plaut. *Trin.* 496.
- D. Quom inopiast, *cupias*: quando eius copiast, tum non *velis*; Plaut. *Trin.* 671.
- E. Quod in manu teneas atque oculis videas, id *desideres*; Plaut. *Trin.* 914.
- F. Unum quom noris, omnis *noris*; Ter. *Ph.* 265.
- G. Accipe nunc, victus tenuis quae quantaque secum Adferat. In primis *valeas* bene; Hor. *Sat.* ii. 2. 70.
- H. Dum tibi fit quod placeat, ille ringitur: tu *rideas*, Prior *bibas*, prior *decumbas*; Ter. *Ph.* 341.
- I. Nam cetera maleficia tum *persequare*, ubi facta sunt, hoc, nisi provideris ne accidat, ubi evenit, frustra iudicia *implores*; Sall. *Cat.* 52.4.
- J. Quem neque gloria neque pericula excitant, neququam *hortere*; timor animi auribus officit; Sall. *Cat.* 58. 2.
- K. Nec porro quaecumque aevo macieque senescunt,  
Nec, mare quae inpendit, vesco sale saxa peresa  
Quid quoque amittant in tempore cernere *possis*; Lucr. i. 325.
- L. Quae si ipse exsequi nequeas, *possis* tamen Scipioni praecipere et  
Laelio ("a Scipio and a Laelius"); Cic. *Sen.* 9. 28.

These look alike. If there were a comfortable category in the grammars into which to put them all, one would not think of separating them.

As the title of the paper implies, I am brought to regard such Subjunctives as expressing general statements of fact,—as corresponding, in effect, to *Indicatives* in the same second person singular indefinite. I wish to translate example A by, "because you

are worth just what you possess ;" B by, "have a penny, you are worth a penny ;" C by, "when you are dead, dead you are," etc. In accordance with this view, § 542 of the Hale-Buck *Grammar* reads: "A general statement of fact is sometimes expressed by a Subjunctive of the Second Person Singular Indefinite ;" and to our example C, there given, is added the statement, "the second *sis* has the force of *es*."

The construction itself will prove to be a simple one to solve, but the exhibition of previous opinion upon the matter must be a somewhat tangled affair, since grammars, grammatical treatises, notes in commentaries written by professional grammarians, and notes by commentators who are not professional grammarians, have all to be taken into the account. It is also obviously impracticable to refer to every note ever written upon any of these passages. The selections, however, will fairly cover the ground.

So far as I know, no grammar or grammatical paper had recognized the existence of the construction for which I am contending. The statements regularly made (where any are made) with regard to the range of the Subjunctive of the second person singular indefinite are of a kind to exclude such an interpretation. Thus Madvig, §370, says: "Diese Form findet sich in bedingter Rede, in hypothetischen Aussagen und in Fragen über das, was geschehen wird und kann, in Nebensätzen mit Conjunctionen, in Relativsätzen (mit *qui* oder einem unbestimmten Relativ), und in Vorschriften und Verboten." To this is added the *Anmerkung*: "Ein solcher conjunctivischer Bedingungssatz führt nicht den Conjunctiv im Hauptsatze herbei." Quite recently (1905), Nutting, *Studies in the Si-Clause*, pp. 84, 85, has distinctly shown the conviction that there is no Subjunctive in a main sentence corresponding to the common second singular indefinite in subordinate clauses. "One looks in vain," he says, "for a clear case of such leveling in Plautus." And Elmer, in his note on F (as will be seen below), in effect says that a general statement of fact in the second singular indefinite *must* be expressed by the Indicative.

The grammarians of course all provide for the Subjunctive second person singular indefinite in conditional or corresponding relative clauses which, if in any other person or number, would be

in the Indicative, as in *memoria minuitur, nisi eam exerceas*, Cic. *Sen.* 7. 21; but they know nothing of the power for which this paper contends. If anywhere they chance to make use of an example of the type before us, it is placed under some already recognized and entirely different category, as we shall see below.

Whatever the grammarians may do, the commentators, it would seem, would frequently have occasion to discuss such examples. The most striking feature of the case is, however, that they generally pass them without comment. Sometimes, indeed, they actually give an explanation of the dependent verb in such combinations, and pass in silence the far more difficult independent one. Thus Greenough, in his edition of the *De senectute* (1873 and in various reprints), says of our example L, “*si . . . nequeas*, gen. cond. (§309 *a*),” but says nothing of *possis*. Occasionally the dependent verb and the main verb are dealt with together and without distinction, with a reference to some rule, such as the grammars afford. This reference, as is natural under the circumstances, never fits. Thus Gudeman, dealing with example I in his edition of Sallust, says, “*persequare . . . provideris . . . implores*: Subjunctive of indefinite second person singular,” and refers to the Allen and Greenough *Grammar*, § 266a. This section, when one turns to it, proves to deal with *independent* “Hortatory” Subjunctives, and to read (266), “The Hortatory Subjunctive is used to express an exhortation, a command, a concession, or a condition;” and (*a*), “The Second Person is used only of an indefinite subject, except in prohibition, in early Latin, and in poetry.” Not only the general headings “independent” and “hortatory,” but the examples given (e. g., *isto bono utare dum adsit*, Cic. *Sen.* 10. 33), show the type meant. But *nisi provideris* is evidently not independent; and it is also difficult to believe that Sallust means to *direct* people to implore in vain, unless, indeed, the editor conceives the idiom to be one of *ironical* command (not provided for in the reference), in which case the explanation should certainly be given. More frequently, if anything at all is said about the main Subjunctive, it is simply classed with the dependent one, and the Subjunctive idiom in the second singular indefinite in “conditional” clauses is referred to

or assumed. Thus Munro, in his comment upon our example K, puts *possis* with *si non relinquas*, *Lucr.* i. 515, *quibus careas*, ii. 4, etc. Thus, again, Greenough, in the note in his edition of the *Satires and Epistles* of Horace, 1888, says of our example A, “*tanti sis* (*you are rated at*), etc. The subjunctive is the regular one of the second person with indefinite subject.” But in his *Grammar* Greenough (the same is true of his revisers) makes no provision for an independent Subjunctive of the second person singular indefinite, except as hortatory or potential; while the treatment of the *dependent* member of the example in question comes in § 309 *a* (518 of the new edition) under the head of “General Conditions,” to which it is obvious that *sis* does not belong. It is clear, also, that general conditions are really meant; for the rule reads: “The Subjunctive is sometimes used in the second person singular to denote the act of an indefinite Subject (*you = any one*). Here the Indicative of a general truth may stand in the apodosis.”<sup>1</sup>

Yet the tendency naturally produced by the sight of the combination of dependent and independent Subjunctives in the same indefinite second person is a good one, and has in a number of instances led, even in the absence of an admitted grammatical category, to the sound interpretation. Thus Wagner, in the note in his *Trinummus* (1875) upon our example E, says, “*id desideres*, ‘that one is apt to forget’: the second person subjunctive expresses generality.” Greenough (1888), as we have seen, translates *tanti sis* of A by “*you are rated*.” Friedländer, in his *Petronii Cena Trimalchionis* (1891) translates our example B by “*Glaubt mir, habe einen As, so giltst du einen As*.” Morris, in his edition of the *Captivi and Trinummus* of Plautus (1898), paraphrasing example C, says, “when you are dead, you are dead in the full sense of the term.” He makes no grammatical comment. Rolfe, in his edition of the *Satires and Epistles* of Horace

<sup>1</sup>The word “sometimes” is not happy. The Subjunctive is regularly used, there being but a very small number of exceptions in the whole range of the literature. Hardly any usage in Latin is more fixed. Or, if the intended meaning is “one sometimes finds examples of . . . ,” then, by the same token, the word “sometimes” ought to be added to every rule in the Grammar. Moreover, the phrase “may stand” in the last line should read “generally stands.”

(1902) puts the main and subordinate clauses in example A together, rightly translating, "because you are rated by the amount of your possessions," and adding, "*habeas* and *sis* are subjunctive because of the indefinite second person singular." No grammatical reference is given. The procedure of Wagner, Greenough, Friedländer, Morris, and Rolfe seems to imply a subconsciousness of the force naturally to be attributed to the independent construction; but these excellent opportunities which Greenough and Morris, as grammarians, had for calling attention to a much misunderstood, and very variously interpreted, construction, and of enunciating its true character, pass unused. Note also, under 4 below, p. 27, a discordant explanation of the exactly similar *per sequare* of example I (namely as Potential) in the Greenough and Daniell Sallust.

The only comment I have noticed which makes a sound explicit statement about the independent construction is that of Schütz (1881), who, in his note upon our passage A, says "*sis*, nicht *es*, weil allgemein, nicht an H. direct gerichtet; 'man gilt.'" To this he adds, "Im Indicativ würde man eher die 1. Person verlangen, weil der Geizige doch sich selbst damit entschuldigen will." He is right in his general feeling, but not right in implying that in the second singular indefinite the Indicative could not be used. See below, at the end of this paper.

The explanations which clearly attempt to bring one or another of the independent Subjunctives in sentences A–L under one or another of the categories provided for in the grammars are of six kinds. I shall first merely state them, without argument.

1. The Subjunctive is that of the *Oratio Obliqua*. This is the favorite older explanation, and is still frequently found. Thus Wüsteman, revision of Heindorf (1843), says of our example A, "man bemerke den im Latein. gewöhnlichen Übergang von der *orat. recta* in die *obliqua*;" H. Düntzer (1869) says "*sis*, Übergang in die abhängige Rede;" Kirchner (1885) says "im Lateinischen geht die Rede aus der directen Construction (*nil satis est*) in die abhängige (*quia tanti . . . sis*) über, was auch in Prosa nicht selten vorkommt;" and G. T. A. Krüger in various editions (as in 1860 and 1866), by a still bolder device,

says “*sis*, statt *es*, als wäre vorhergegangen: *nil satis esse ait*. Also auf einer Anakoluthie beruhend.” G. Krüger says the same, in re-editing his father’s edition in 1876. Among the later editors, Kiessling (1886) says the same in the sentence, “der Konjunktiv *sis = esse putaris*.” Palmer (my edition is of 1888) seems to mean the same by his phrase “general *opinion*” in saying, “the subjunctive *sis* is used because it is the general opinion, indefinite.” And Harper’s *Lexicon* (1879) means the same, in putting example A under the Subjunctive illustration of the statement, “construed with indicative in asserting a fact; with subjunctive in stating an assumed reason, or one entertained by another mind.”

2. The Subjunctive is that of Command or Exhortation (“Imperative”). Thus Blase, in his recently published “Tempora u. Modi” in the *Historische Grammatik d. lat. Sprache*, p. 136, puts our D as his first example under the head of the Jussive, Hortative, or (true) Optative, and accounts for *non* as modifying, not the sentence as a whole, but the single word *velis*. The same explanation seems to be meant, p. 123, for C, which is translated by “so bald man tot ist, soll man es ganz sein.” And the same is explicitly suggested by Antoine and Lallier as possible for I. See below, at the end of 4.

3. The Subjunctive is Permissive. Thus Elmer, on example H, says, “*rideas, bibas*, etc.: subj. of permission, involving the yielding of somebody’s will; to be carefully distinguished from the potential.”

4. The Subjunctive is Potential. It is by the Potential formula (“you can laugh, drink your wine before him,” etc.) that Morris H. Morgan, in his translation of the *Phormio* (1904), renders these same Subjunctives which Elmer tells us are “to be carefully distinguished from the potential.” The express word “Potential” is used of one or another of our examples by many commentators. Thus Dillenburger (my edition is of 1867) both affirms this explanation and denies 1 above, in the note: “*sis non per anacoluthiam positum est pro es, quasi praecederet nil satis esse ait, quia, sed est potentialis modus, ut apud Lucilium.*” Likewise G. Krüger, who in the edition of 1876 explained *sis* in A as due to

*Oratio Obliqua*, explains it in the edition of 1889 as Potential. This same explanation is given by Lucian Müller (1891) for A and B, by Blase *op. cit.*, p. 142, for B, by Schütz *op. cit.* for G, and by Schmalz *Bell. Cat.* (my edition is of 1885) for J.

Unfortunately this word "Potential," as used in our grammars, is ambiguous. It includes meanings so far apart, at their extremes, as "may possibly" or "can," and "would certainly." The former idea alone should bear the name Potential, while the other (seen most easily in the common Subjunctive conclusion) should bear some name like that of Ideal Certainty, which I have given it in my own grammatical writing.<sup>1</sup> It is the true Potential use, apparently, that Krüger and Müller have in mind, and likewise Freeman and Sloman upon our example D. This, at any rate, is what is meant by Greenough and Daniell in their Sallust, in the note upon *persequare* in our example I. The translation given is "one may prosecute," and the reference (Allen and Greenough *Grammar* 311a) is to the statement, "The Potential Subjunctive is used to denote an action not as actually performed, but as possible." Similarly Antoine and Lallier, *Salluste, Conjuration de Catilina* (1888), write in their commentary: "*persequare* pourrait être un subjonctif impératif, puisque le sujet est indéterminé; mais en réalité, comme le note M. P. Thomas, c'est le subjonctif potentiel: 'on peut ne les poursuivre que lorsqu'ils sont accomplis.'"

5. The Subjunctive is that of Ideal Certainty. This is doubtless what Roby means in placing our example J under the "hypothetical Subjunctive," §1544 (cf. §1528 and 3). The corresponding English for our examples would then be "one would." This is also substantially what Kiessling means in saying, upon example G, "*valeas*, Konj. der gemilderten Behauptung, *ὑγιαίνως ἄν*," L. Müller in saying, upon the same example, "*valeas*; wie oft in Satiren und Episteln, urbane Milderung der Behauptung," Heinze, new edition (1906) of Kiessling's *Satires* of Horace, in saying, "*valeas scil. si parvo vivas*," Rolfe *op. cit.*, in saying, "*valeas*: potential subjunctive with an implied protasis, *si tenui*

<sup>1</sup>Delbrück *Verg. Syntax* II, p. 371, and Brugmann *Kurze vergl. Gramm.* II, p. 584, while accepting my term, have misunderstood my meaning.

*victu utaris*,” Palmer *op. cit.*, in saying, “*valeas*, a potential or modified future,” Wickham *Satires, Epistles, and De arte poetica* of Horace, 1891, in saying, “*valeas*, potential,” and Bennett *Cato Maior*, 1897, in his note upon L, “if you should be unable to practice this.” This must likewise be what Wickham had in mind in saying of A, “the mood is probably the same as in the original, ‘*sis*=ἀντίης;’” though I fancy that this is a restored original, not a known one. And this is also probably what Heinze means, *op. cit.*, in saying of the same example, “der potentielle Konjunktiv *sis* wie bei Petron. 77 *assem habeas assem valeas*.” (It will be noticed that Heinze has abandoned Kiessling’s explanation.)

6. The independent verb of example F, *unum quom noris, omnis noris*, is explained by at least two of the commentators as not a Subjunctive at all, but an Indicative of the future perfect. Thus Dzitzko says, “*noris* ist beidemal Fut. exact;” and Elmer gives the same view, with the reasoning which brings him to it, as follows; “*noris*: in both cases fut. perf. ind. equivalent to fut. If the first *noris* were the perf. subj. of an indefinite second person, we should have *omnis novisti*, instead of *omnis noris*.”

The error of procedure in all these explanations is of a kind that shows itself again and again in the history of grammatical study. Those who have dealt with one or another example of a type have, in repeated instances, explained the example which they had before them, without stopping to make a *collection* of examples sufficient in number to enable a scientific inference of any kind to be drawn. The perfect method is, first, to make a complete collection, and then to study every example, in the light of all. Human life being, however, what it is, one must, until our work is better organized, be content with a fairly large collection. In making this, one must throw aside grammatical prepossessions, and admit all examples that would naturally seem to belong together. Further, it would be worth while to look, at least, at any sentences that might be found, in which ideas of the same general kind seemed to be expressed, but by a different mechanism. Further, and without any doubt, as much of the context of the Subjunctive examples as could possibly be illuminating should be added for each. Here again our prevailing

method is sadly defective. In a number of examples of the type which we are studying, the context immediately and irresistibly overthrows the explanations given. The material being thus gathered, every explanation that might account for one or more of the mass of examples, but would not account for all, or that in any example would fail to fit the context, should be rejected. The result of this process in the present instance will be the overthrow of all six of the explanations given for the examples cited above.

Assuming this for the moment to be the case, the next step should be to seek for an explanation that will explain all the examples, and that will be in harmony with the context in all. If one is thereby brought to believe in the existence of a construction not recognized by the grammars, one need not be alarmed, if one has confidence in the dispassionateness of the procedure that has brought him to his conclusion.

Finally, one may properly seek for a probable origin of the usage thus reached, out of some construction or constructions known actually to exist. The two steps, however,—the establishment of the existence of a construction, and the search for its origin,—may be entirely disconnected. Failure to take the second step successfully will not of itself invalidate the first. A number of constructions are surely known to exist of which the origins are not surely known. In the present case, however, both steps can, I think, be securely taken.

In the collection which follows, the examples are arranged by groups of ideas, or for convenience in reference:

1. At bona pars hominum, decepta cupidine falso  
 ‘Nil satis est,’ inquit, ‘quia tanti quantum habeas sis.’  
 Quid facias illi? Iubeas miserum esse libenter  
 Quatenus id facit. Hor. *Sat.* i. 1. 61.
2. Aurum adque ambitio specimen virtutis viriquest.  
 Quantum habeas, tantum ipse *sies* tantique *habearis*; *Lucil. Schol. ad Iuv.* iii. 143.
3. Mirum quin tu illo tecum divitias feras.  
 Ubi mortuos sis, ita *sis* ut nomen cluet; *Plaut. Trin.* 495.
4. Tarda sunt quae in commune expostulanter: privatam gratiam  
 statim mereare, statim *recipias*; *Tac. Ann.* i. 28. 21.

5. Nam si velis quod nondum vetitum est, *timeas* ne vetere: at si prohibita impune transcenderis, neque metus ultra neque pudor est; Tac. *Ann.* iii. 54. 10.
  6. Quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? In qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videoas tuumque ostendas, nihil exploratum *habeas*; Cic. *Am.* 26. 97.
  7. Mediocriterne causis nocent, cum . . . . adversariorum adiumenta confirmant? . . . . Si, quae sunt in iis invidiosa, . . . . invidiosiora faciunt, quantum est in eo tandem mali? Quid, si . . . . contumeliosius invehare, nonne a te iudices *abalienes*? Quid, si . . . . non intellegas te in iudices invehiri, mediocre peccatum est? Quid, si . . . . causam relinquas, nihilne *noceas*? . . . . In ipsis autem argumentis si quid posueris . . . . aperte falsum . . . . nihilne *noceas*? Cic. *De or.* ii. 75, 303–306.
  8. Liber captivos avis ferae consimilis est:  
Semel fugiendi si datast occasio, satis est,  
Numquam postilla *possis* prendere; Plaut. *Capt.* 116.
  9. Nulla potest oculorum acies contenta tueri,  
Nec porro quae cumque aevo macieque senescunt,  
Nec, mare quae inpendent, vesco sale saxa peresa  
Quid quoque amittant in tempore cernere *possis*; Lucr. i. 324.  
Similarly ii. 220, 763, 768; iii. 856, 1024; iv. 572, 1231; vi. 113.  
Cf. the formulae *videre licet*, vi. 79; *licet cognoscere*, vi. 167, etc.
  10. Hostes alienigenae aut oppressi serviunt aut recepti in amicitiam beneficio se obligatos putant: qui autem ex numero civium, dementia aliqua depravati, hostes patriae semel esse coeperunt, nec vi coercere nec beneficio placare *possis*; Cic. *Cat.* iv. 10. 22.
  11. Sed tamen est decorus senis sermo quietus et remissus, facitque persaepe ipsa sibi audientiam diserti senis composita et mitis oratio. Quam si ipse exsequi nequeas, *possis* tamen Scipioni praecipere et Laelio; Cic. *Sen.* 9. 28.
  12. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non *possis* (really an independent sentence) si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam; Cic. *Off.* i. 31. 111.
  13. Ut non omnem frugem neque arborem in omni agro reperire *possis*, sic non omne facinus in omni vita nascitur; Cic. *Sex. Rosc.* 27. 75.
  14. Matronae praeter faciem nil cernere *possis*,  
Cetera, ni Catia est, demissa veste tegentis;  
\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \*
- Altera nil obstat: Cois tibi paene videre est,  
Ut nudam, ne crure malo, ne sit pede turpi;

Metiri *possis* oculo latus. An tibi mavis  
 Insidias fieri pretiumque avellier ante  
 Quam mercem ostendi? Hor. *Sat.* i. 2. 94, 95, and 101–105.

15. Vix credere *possis*  
     Quam sibi non sit amicus; Hor. *Sat.* i. 2. 19.
16. Accipe nunc, victus tenuis quae quantaque secum  
     Adferat. In primis *valeas* bene. Hor. *Sat.* ii. 2. 70.
17. Quanta cuiusque animo audacia natura aut moribus inest, tanta in  
     bello patere solet. Quem neque gloria neque pericula excitant,  
     nequiquam *hortere*; timor animi auribus officit; Sall. *Cat.* 58. 2.
18. Non votis neque suppliciis muliebribus auxilia deorum parantur:  
     vigilando, agundo, bene consulundo prospera omnia cedunt: ubi  
     socordiae te atque ignaviae tradideris, nequiquam deos *implores*:  
     irati infestique sunt; Sall. *Cat.* 52. 29.
19. Nam cetera maleficia tum *persequare*, ubi facta sunt; hoc, nisi  
     provideris ne accidat, ubi evenit, frustra iudicia *implores*: capta  
     urbe nihil fit reliqui victis; Sall. *Cat.* 52. 4.
20. Siquoi mutuom quid dederis, fit pro proprio perditum:  
     Quom repetas, inimicum amicum *invenias* beneficio tuo; Plaut.  
     *Trin.* 1051.
21. Neque ego homines magis asinos numquam vidi: ita plagis costae  
     callent:  
     Quos quom ferias, tibi plus *noceas*. Eo enim ingenio hi sunt fla-  
     gritribae,  
     \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*  
     At faciem quom aspicias eorum, hau mali videntur; Plaut. *Pseud.* 136.
22. Sed eccum incedit: at quom aspicias tristem, frugi *censeas*; Plaut.  
     *Cas.* 562. Similarly cum . . . . perventum est, tum *intellegas*; Cic.  
     *Div.* ii. 21. 48.
23. Tene asymbolum venire unctum atque lautum e balineis,  
     Otiosum ab animo, quom ille et cura et sumptu absumitur!  
     Dum tibi fit quod placeat, ille ringitur: tu *rideas*,  
     Prior *bibas*, prior *decumbas*; cena dubia adponitur; Ter. *Ph.* 339.
24. Abs quivis homine, quom est opus, beneficium accipere *gaudeas*;  
     Verum enim vero id demum iuuat, si, quem aequomst facere, is bene  
     facit; Ter. *Ad.* 254.
25. Minus placet magis quod suadetur: quod dissuadetur placet.  
     Quom inopiast, *cupias*: quando eius copiast, tum non *velis*; *Trin.*  
     670.
26. CH. Vide modo ut hominem noveris. SY. Tamquam me: fieri  
     istuc solet;  
     Quod in manu teneas atque oculis videas, id *desideres*; *Trin.* 913.

27. Lippi illic oculi servos est simillimus.  
Si non est, *nolis esse neque desideres*:  
Si est, abstinere quin attingas non *queas*; Plaut. *Bacch.* 913.
28. De mortuis loquor, qui nulli sunt; nos, qui sumus, num aut cornibus  
caremus aut pinnis? Ecquis id dixerit? Certe nemo. Quid ita?  
Quia, cum id non habeas quod tibi nec usu nec natura sit aptum,  
non *careas*, etiamsi sentias te non habere; Cic. *Tusc.* i. 36. 87.
29. Unum quom noris, omnis *noris*; Ter. *Ph.* 265.
30. Licentiam *des* linguae, cum verum petas; Publil. 308. Similarly<sup>1</sup>  
10, 78, 81, 88, 117, 185, 232, 233, 252, 285, 331, 361, 382, 394, 427, 468,  
512, 530, 592, 635, 645; also, in perf. Subj., 126, 364.
31. Assem habeas, assem *valeas*; habes, *habeberis*; Petron. 77.<sup>2</sup>

We proceed to test, in the light of this collection, the explanations that have thus far been given for this and that example taken by itself.

1. The construction can not be that of the *Oratio Obliqua*. This explanation was forced, even in the case of the first example. To many of the others, it can not be applied at all. Thus 3 can not mean "you are thought to be dead," 4 "you are thought to receive at once," etc.

2. The Subjunctive can not be one of Command. Blase's explanation of *velis* in 25 seems to be due to a passing error of interpretation, and certainly can not be accepted. Even if it would there fit, however, it would not, by any stretching, fit in 1, 2, 32, and others. Lucilius, Horace, and Petronius do not mean to command a man *to be* worth just what he possesses.

The only possible theory that could make these constructions to be of "Jussive" origin would be that they began as ironical commands, like "cry for what you don't have," and (probably) the second verb in "go further and fare worse." But Blase presumably did not have this explanation in mind. And, in any case, it would be impossible, from such an origin, to account for the

<sup>1</sup> By the generally accepted readings. In a few cases, the MSS are divided.

<sup>2</sup> *Habes* is given in all of Bücheler's editions as the reading of the single MS (Parisin. 7989) which has this passage, and is reaffirmed by Bücheler in a private letter. Omont has been good enough to report directly from the MS, to the same effect. The readings *habeas* and *habe*, respectively from the passage as repeated in Friedländer's notes (*habes* in his text) and the Segebade and Lommatzsch *Lexicon Petronianum*, are errors, as I am assured by Friedländer and Lommatzsch. But of course it is the *habeberis* that has value for the present purpose.

negative, except by supposing the construction to have lost every vestige of its initial feeling, and to have *become* a statement of fact. This would bring us to the actual force for which I am contending, though by a very improbable route.<sup>1</sup>

3. The Subjunctive can not be Permissive. The independent Subjunctive, if expressing the idea at all, would express Permission granted by the speaker. Such can not be the meaning in the example (23) for which Elmer gives this explanation. But, even if it were, it would be impossible to find the force in 1, 2, 3, etc. The meaning of 3, e. g., can not be “when you are dead, you are permitted to be dead in fact.”

4. The Subjunctive can not be Potential, in the true sense. The true Potential is, to be sure, common enough in the second person singular indefinite. It indicates what lies within one’s power, or within the possibilities of one’s experience. Thus in Liv. xxii. 50. 9, *cuneo quidem hoc laxum atque solutum agmen ut si nihil obstet disicias* means, “by the use of the wedge-formation it lies within one’s power to split this loose and disorganized line as if there were nothing in the way” (cf. πλησίον ἀλλήλων· καὶ κεν διοιστεύσεις, μ 102); and in Iuv. xiv. 41, *Catilinam quocumque in populo videoas, quocumque sub axe* means “one may see (it lies within the possibilities of any man’s experience to see) a Catiline in any nation, under any sky.” It is also quite true that *persequare* of 19 might by itself be interpreted, with Greenough and Daniell, as Potential (“it lies within one’s power to punish other ill deeds at once”) and 4, with Blase, *op. cit.* p. 142, in a similar way. But such a translation would be forced for *frustra implores* (in the same passage, 19, with *persequare*), making it mean “it lies within one’s power to implore in vain,” or “one might perhaps implore in vain;” while it would be completely out of the question for such examples as 1, 2, and 3, making them mean “it lies within your power to be worth as much as you possess,” “it lies within your power to be dead in fact,” etc.

A special word needs to be said with regard to the examples with *possis*. In such cases, the grammarians and commentators,

<sup>1</sup> In Plut. περὶ φιλοπλούτιας VII, p. 526 C, κέρδαινε καὶ φείδον καὶ τοσούτου νόμιζε σαυτὸν δξιον, δσον ἀν ἔχης, the advice is not ironical, but serious.

as Blase *op. cit.*, p. 142, upon our examples 8 and 9, and Munro upon 9, are too ready to give the explanation "Potential," confusing the meaning which the verb has in itself with the meaning of the mood employed in the particular instance. In *videas* of Verg. *Georg.* 1. 387, rightly cited by Blase in the same passage, the verb itself expresses the idea of seeing, while the *mood* conveys the idea of the possibility of that seeing. *Possis*, correspondingly, if the *mood* is to be really potential, would have to mean either "you have the power to have the power" or "it may possibly happen that you should have the power,"—meanings obviously out of the question here, and probably, in fact, nowhere occurring. It should be remembered, too, that by Roman idiom (apart from the usage which I am endeavoring to establish) the natural mood to use for *possum* in saying "one may" would be the Indicative, *potes*.

The only possible way in which to deal with *possis* by any of the categories hitherto recognized in our grammars would be by interpreting it as meaning "one would be able." This is the Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty, to which we pass.

5. The construction can not be one of Ideal Certainty ("you would"). Such an explanation would, in the absence of any other, tolerably explain *valeas* of 16 ("you would in that case be well"), and might, with some forcing, be held to account for several of the examples with *possis*, and also for 17 ("it would be useless to urge"), and for 22 ("you would think him good for something"); but it would be unreasonable for 1, 2, 3, and many others. The natural meaning can not be "one would be worth what one should possess," etc. Still less reasonable would it be for 21. The speaker is actually flogging the slaves as he speaks. He is in no frame of mind to say, "if one should flog them, one would hurt one's self worse than them." And, finally, the explanation is obviously impossible for *rideas*, *bibas*, and *decumbas* of 23. The meaning can not be, "his face is drawn with anxiety; you would laugh, you would drink before him, you would take your place at table before him."

The same reasoning would destroy any theory that should resort to the modified form of the Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty known as the "Subjunctive of Softened Assertion." This might,

though not without strain, be adopted for *velis* of 25 and *nolis* of 27 (making them correspond to *velim* and *nolim*), and in consequence be resorted to for *cupias* of 25, and even for *desideres* of 26 and 27. But it would not fit the equivalent of *desideres*, namely, *careas* of 28; and it obviously would be impossible to find such a meaning in any other of the examples.

6. The construction in all the examples except 29 is obviously not an Indicative one. Dziatzko and Elmer would therefore not be through with their difficulty after explaining the ambiguous form *noris* as a Future Perfect.

These six explanations are all that suggest themselves as possible to attempt, with the categories that we now have in the grammars. They prove to be insufficient. None of them will account for all the examples. Their extreme difficulty, and the unsatisfactoriness of the whole method of procedure, become very obvious, if one sums up one's impressions by recalling that different writers have given different explanations for the same examples, that the same writer has at different times given different explanations for the same example, that certain writers have been willing to admit either of two explanations for the same example, and that certain writers (as Blase in the case of *velis* of 25 and *valeas* of 31) have put under different explanations examples obviously similar.

We must then set up a new tenet of some kind. In reaching this, three factors are to be taken into the account.

1. The natural interpretation of the passage in each case. It is upon such interpretations that all grammatical categories must ultimately be based. In the present set of examples the natural interpretation is sure. If our minds were grammatically dispassionate, a judgment founded on the reasonable demands of meaning in such verbs as *sis* in 1, *habearis* in 2, *sis* in 3, *des* in 30, and many others, would see in these examples plain statements of a general *fact*. The only reasonable interpretations are: "a man is valued according to his possessions" (1, 2); "when you are dead, dead you are" (3); "when you ask for the truth, you give a man a chance to say anything he pleases" (30); etc. And

it is obviously an interpretation of this kind that Porphyrio had in mind in writing, in his comment upon *iubeas*, etc., of example 1, *relinque eum, inquit, qui miser est, quoniam deduci ab hac opinione non potest, quo minus putet tanti esse unumquemque, quantas divitias habet.* The direct form of the *opinio* would evidently be, *tanti est unusquisque, quantas divitias habet.*

2. If anywhere else we can find other modes of expression obviously conveying the same general class of ideas as any of our Subjunctives under examination, we should consider their suggestions.

Now it happens that many of our examples are *sententiae*. One of these *sententiae* is the very familiar one (appearing three times in our collection) upon the relation between a man's possessions and the estimation in which he is held. It can easily be matched.

*Χρήματα, χρήματ' ἀνήρ* (scil. ἐστι), ὃς φᾶ κτεάνων θ' ἄμα λειφθεὶς καὶ φίλων; “‘Money, money (is) the man,’ he said, ‘when robbed at once of goods and friends;’” Pind. *Isthm.* 2. 11.

Οἱ γοῦν πατέρες τοντὶ πρῶτον τοὺς σφετέρους νίέσι παραινοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴν εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν τάχιστα ἀφίκωνται τὸν ἥδη φρονεῖν, ὡς δοκοῦσι, σκοπεῖν ὁπόθεν πλούσιοι ἔσονται, ὡς, ἂν μέν τι ἔχῃς, ἢξιός του εἶ, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὐδενός. *Eryx.* Pseudoplat. 396 C.

Non quare et unde, quid habeas, tantum rogant.

Ubique tanti quisque quantum habuit fuit; Sen. *Ep. Mor.* 115. 14. from the lost *Danae* of Euripides (Nauck. T. G. F.; p. 324).

Pauper ubique iacet; Ov. *Fast.* 1. 218.

Dat census honores; Ov. *Am.* III. 8. 55 and *Fast.* 1. 217.

Quisquis habet nummos, secura *navigat* aura; Petron. 137.

Quantum quisque sua nummorum servat in arca,

Tantum *habet* et fidei; Iuv. iii. 143.

Unde et illud proverbium: Quantum habebis, tantus *eris*; Augustin. *De disc. Christ.* 11. 12.

The second Greek example is an especially striking one, since, though the main sentence (a general one) is cast in the third person plural, the general second singular indefinite is retained in the dependent clause, and is in the Indicative. The phrase *illud proverbium* in the last example should also be noted.

It would seem, then, that the natural idea to come into the

mind in expressing the relation between a man's money and the estimation in which the world holds him is that of a general statement of fact.

Several of the examples refer to individual persons. Now among them are certain ones in which the ideas, down to the end of the introductory clause, look alike. Thus *at quom aspicias tristem* of 22 is substantially like *at faciem quom aspicias eorum* of 21. It would seem somewhat probable, then, that the concluding clauses would express similar ideas. These clauses are *frugi censeas* and *hui mali videntur*. They prove, as expected, to be alike in general force. It is probable, then, that the mood-force is the same, namely, that of a statement of fact.

These are the first factors in the determination of the nature of the idiom under discussion. The most natural interpretation to put upon these Subjunctives, whether in and by themselves, or in the light of the expression of the same general ideas by other means, is that they are statements of fact.

3. The third factor in the determination of the force of the mood lies in the study of the context of such of the examples as possess a closely attached one, of the same general bearing. This factor is of the same essential nature as the second, but is more decisive. It is, in fact, completely sufficient, by itself alone, to determine the answer to our question. It happens that in many cases the Subjunctive under examination is put into exact parallelism with a general statement of fact in the Indicative. Thus, in 8, *possis* is the amplification of *satis est* (not *sit*); in 5, *timeas* is balanced against *neque metus . . . est*, and, in 18, *prospera omnia cedunt* against *neququam deos implores*; in 24, *gaudeas* is set up as the antithesis of *iuvat*; in 23, *rideas, bibas, and decumbas* are hemmed in between the two general statements *ringitur* and *adponitur*, with the parallelism still more strongly brought out by the antithesis *ille . . . tu . . .*; in 19, *frustra iudicia implores* is justified by the general statement *fit*, and, in 20, the general statement *fit* by *invenias*; in 14, *matronae . . . nil cernere possis* is set over against *altera nil obstat*, and *videre est* is carried out by *metiri possis oculo*; in 9, *nulla potest oculorum acies . . . tueri* is clearly parallel to *nec*

*cernere possis*, and, in 13, *ut non . . . in omni agro reperire possis* to *sic non . . . in omni vita nascitur*; while in 17, not only is *hortere* balanced against a general statement *officit*, but the two together form the unfolding of the contents of the very significant Indicative *solet*, "it is regularly the case that." Note similarly *solet . . . desideres* in 26. In 28, *careas* is balanced against *caremus*. In 7, *abalienes* and *nihilne noceas (bis)* are parallel with *mediocriterne nocent, quantum est mali*, and *mediocre peccatum est*. And, finally, in 31, the correspondence between *valeas* and *habeberis* is so obvious that I am almost ashamed to have printed anything of the present paper except the title and this example.

The condition of things being what has been seen, there can be no reasonable doubt that the second person singular of the Latin Subjunctive may be employed to make independent statements of a general fact.

Such a conclusion should afford a sensible relief. The variety of explanations adduced above as having been actually applied to one and another of these examples, the heavily forced character of some of them, even for the individual cases to which they are applied, the contradictory explanations made by different writers for the same examples, the shift of ground on the part of one writer,—all show how hard beset grammarians and commentators have been.

In the collections employed, only examples that are surely to be classified as statements of fact are given. Once established, however, the category fits many other examples more naturally than does the category of Possibility, or that of Ideal Certainty.

The more important step has been taken. It remains to see whether the second is possible,—whether a probable origin can be found for the Subjunctive construction. I have long taught the following:

The extremely common use of the Subjunctive of the second singular indefinite in generalizing assumptions (relative or temporal clauses, or express conditions) might well, in time, affect the mood of the main sentence. To express the generalizing idea

in the dependent clause, the verb in any person or number except the second singular indefinite was in the Indicative, but if it occurred in *this* form, then the mood was, by fixed force of habit, the Subjunctive. The Subjunctive would then seem to be a natural mood to use *wherever* the generalizing force was intended, if the second singular indefinite were employed. Just as elsewhere, in the expression of this idea, Indicative went with Indicative, so here it would seem natural that Subjunctive should go with Subjunctive. If, saying *quod quis in manu tenet*, one goes on with *id desiderat*, then, saying *quod in manu teneas*, it would be natural to go on with *id desideres*.

This influence would be all the stronger from the fact that, whatever may have been the original force of the Subjunctive in these dependent clauses,<sup>1</sup> that force could no longer be clearly felt. The Subjunctive of the second singular indefinite had become merely the *sign of universality*. Why, then, should it remain confined to the subordinate clause?

This natural tendency toward extension would probably be furthered by the fact that the same second person singular indefinite happens to be in frequent use in a number of true independent Subjunctive idioms. Thus it is found in the Subjunctive Question of Perplexity, as in *quid agas?* "what is one to do?" Iuv. iv. 14; in the Question of Obligation, Propriety, or Reasonableness (to avail myself of a classification and name from own teaching),<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I believe the construction to have originated in a Volitive of the imagination, as in "lose your money, and all your friends desert you" (not, as seems everywhere assumed, in the Potential Subjunctive); and I have so classed it in the syntax of the Hale-Buck Grammar, §504. 2. But a treatment of this question would properly involve a discussion of the Greek generalizing Subjunctive (which I hold to be of parallel origin), and a discussion of my difference from Delbrück with regard to an important group of Greek constructions, for which this paper affords no room.

<sup>2</sup> The Subjunctive of Obligation, Propriety, or Reasonableness, first set up as a general category in my teaching at Cornell, is made one of the principal families of the mood in my general scheme, and several of the hitherto difficult types of dependent clauses seem to find full solution in it (Hale-Buck Grammar, §§512, 513; also *Classical Journal* I. 1. 1905, "An Experiment in the Teaching of First and Second Year Latin," where a conspectus is given of the uses of the Latin Subjunctive, classified according to origins). Not only is the mood-use a frequent one, but, in my opinion, it furnishes the missing link between the true Optative and the Optative (Latin Subjunctive) of Natural Likelihood, Possibility, or Ideal Certainty. (See my "Leading Mood-Forces in the Indo-European Parent Speech," *Proceedings of the American Philological Association* XXXII, p. cxx [1901].)

as in *cur tamen corripias?* "Why should one chide her?" Iuv. x. 291; and in the form of statement which lies in the neutral territory of Natural Likelihood, Possibility, and Ideal Certainty, as in *crederes victos*, "one might well think them conquered," "one might think them conquered," "one would think them conquered," Liv. ii. 43. 9. The combination of these influences with the one already mentioned might well have led the Romans to feel that, whatever mood-feeling they had to convey, the Subjunctive was the natural mood to use, if the person was the second singular indefinite. But, most of all (after the primary cause), the natural tendency to extend the idiom would be strengthened by the very frequent occurrence of a construction which, though evidently of true Potential origin, clearly suggests and implies fact. Thus Juvenal's Potential in *Catilinam quocumque in populo videoas, quocumque sub axe*," "one may see a Catiline in any nation, under any sky," xiv. 41, easily suggests "one sees . . . ." That which is said to be anywhere and everywhere possible is easily understood as anywhere and everywhere taking place. The number of examples of this type (*videoas, cernas*, etc.) is very large. An especially instructive set is afforded by *reperias*. I give three of these in sequence:

Quamvis malam rem quaeras, illic *reperias*; Plaut. *Trin.* 554.

Per pol quam paucos *reperias* meretricibus  
Fidelis evenire amatores, Syra; Ter. *Hec.* 58.

Ut enim sunt, quem ad modum supra dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas anteponant, sic *reperias* multos, quibus periculosa et calida consilia quietis et cogitatis splendidiora et maiora videantur; Cic. *Off.* i. 24. 82.

In the first of these, "one may find it there," may suggest "one finds it there." In the second, "how few one can find," strongly suggests "how few one finds;" while in the third, *reperias qui bus . . . .* is put into formal parallelism with the general statement *sunt qui . . . .*, "there are people who . . . ." *Reperias* accordingly is completely ready, at any rate, to convey the idea of fact.

So much for the construction under examination. An independent use of the Subjunctive to express statements—assertions of fact—in the second person singular indefinite, exists; and it

probably is historically an extension from other constructions in which the Subjunctive had, originally, true-mood forces.<sup>1</sup>

But did the construction become universal, where the idea of a general statement of fact was to be conveyed, and the second singular indefinite was to be used? It seems not. The older usage, which of course must have been that of the Indicative mood, still survived. In the future, the idea had necessarily to be expressed by the Indicative if expressed at all, since the independent Anticipatory Subjunctive had disappeared, wholly or almost wholly, from the language. But there are also examples of the present.

#### EXAMPLES OF THE PRESENT INDICATIVE<sup>2</sup>

*Nescis* quid vesper serus vehat; Varro *Sat. Men. ap.* Gell. xiii. 11. 1; similarly, but without *serus*, in Macrob. i. 7. 12, and ii. 8. 2. (It would seem that *nescis* must be general, since in all three passages the sentence to which it belongs is given as the title of a book.)

Bis *peccas*, cum peccanti obsequium commodas; Publil. 52.

Cum das avaro praemium ut noceat *rogas*; Publil. 122. Similarly 658.<sup>3</sup>

Ita, si silenda feceris, factum ipsum (*scil. culpatur*), si laudanda non sileas, ipse *culparis*; Plin. *Ep.* i. 8. 15.

#### EXAMPLES OF THE FUTURE INDICATIVE

Quantumvis quare sit macer *invenies*; Catull. 89. 6.

Nulli facilius quam malo *invenies* parem; Publil. 395.<sup>4</sup>

Facile *invenies* qui bene faciant, cum qui fecerunt coles; Publil. 664.<sup>4</sup>

. . . . divitiae et opes, quas facilius *invenies* qui vituperet quam qui fastidiat; Tac. *Dial.* 8.

<sup>1</sup>Hence in my grammatical scheme, referred to above, this use is placed under the distinct heading of "Subjunctive Constructions Due to the Influence of Other Constructions."

<sup>2</sup>Examples are not given from the satiric poets, since they appear often to have been addressing, either through a long passage or for the moment, an imagined *individual* (cf. our "gentle reader"), and the exact discrimination of force is therefore uncertain for the Indicative mood. See, for instance, in 14 above, and cf. Lebreton *Études sur la langue et la grammaire de Cicéron*, pp. 349 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Publilius's Indicatives in the *dependent* second person singular indefinite are interesting, and will be treated, as well as Blase's view that there is no second person singular Subjunctive of Indefiniteness in dependent Clauses (*Studien u. Kritiken* II, pp. 5-8, 1905), in a later paper already indicated.

<sup>4</sup>In the light of the other examples given, Wölfflin's "emendation" to *invenias* is clearly unnecessary.

Ideo autem (apes) pungunt, quia ubicumque dulce est, ibi et acidum invenies; Petron. 56.

Assem habeas, assem valeas: habes, *habeberis*; Petron. 77.

Unde et illud proverbium: Quantum habebis, tantus eris; Augustin. *De disc. Christ.* 11. 12.

My collections for all these idioms are the result of chance happenings upon examples, not of methodical search over the whole ground. They make it fairly clear, however, that the Subjunctive is distinctly common, the Present Indicative, outside of Plutarch and the satiric poets (see the last footnote but two), very rare. The statement in the Hale-Buck *Grammar* is accordingly not strong enough. For "sometimes," "regularly" should be substituted. It should be noted also that, of the various verbs employed in the Subjunctive idiom, *possis*, "one can," seems to be in largest use.

Finally, can any definition be made of the difference between the Subjunctive and Indicative idioms? The question may be answered as follows:

In the Subjunctive construction, the mood is a *sign* of generality. In the Indicative construction, the mood is *not* a sign of generality. One *feels* generality, if the context demands it; but it is not hinted at by the mood itself. The difference in the idioms is like the difference between English "you" and "one." "You" may turn out to be either individual or general. "One" is immediately and necessarily general. Compare the "Tacit causal *qui*-clause," Indicative, and the "Explicit causal *qui*-clause," Subjunctive (Hale, *Cum-constructions*, pp. 97, 112 f., or 107, 127 f. of the German translation).